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The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their 
geographic situation, their common history, through social and econom-
ic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pres-
sure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the 
financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political 
integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on 
the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.
The Russia policies of EU member states and 
of the European institutions are dominated by 
the rhetoric of partnership for modernization. 
Europe is interested in a guarantor for security 
and in reliable energy suppliers. It remains to 
be seen to what extent today’s Russia will live 
up to European norms and values, and in what 
form European policy will be able to react to the 
most recent developments.
The initial conditions for relations between 
the EU and Russia include, on the one hand, 
the crisis in European integration, and on the 
other, Russia’s democratic deficits. Formally, 
bilateral relations are structured by the Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 
1997. Although the PCA was originally negoti-
ated to last 10 years, it is automatically renewed 
on an annual basis unless one party decides to 
cancel it. The PCA no longer matches the politi-
cal realities, as the fruitless EU-Russia summit 
in December 2012 demonstrated for all to see. 
For seven years, both sides have been called to 
work out and then ratify a new bilateral agree-
ment. Before that can be done, however, it is 
necessary to clarify fundamental questions and 
only then, based on this analysis, develop new 
means of cooperation.
Russia as a European partner
Vladimir Putin’s re-election as President of 
Russia in May 2012 is a signal for the future 
development of the country’s society, state 
and economy. Russia is in a strong economic 
position, thanks to its rich reserves of oil and 
natural gas. In terms of building a democratic 2
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The state’s effectiveness for its citizens can be 
measured by the education system, provision 
of health care, and protection against poverty.
Putin, however, is not following this path. “Stra-
tegic Global Outlook: 2030,” a study under-
taken by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ 
Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO) under the leadership of 
Alexander Dynkin, ties the development of the 
global economy with the prognosis for interna-
tional security policy. In the study, a team of 
Russian academics researched ideology, admin-
istration, global economics, social development, 
and global security policy, as well as the role 
of global actors such as the United States, the 
European Union, Asia, Africa and Latin Ameri-
ca. A goal of the study was to determine global 
actors’ influence on Russia. By contrast, the 
authors consider Russia as an actor in its own 
right only very briefly in the concluding chap-
ter, devoting less than 10 pages to the topic.
Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov of Carn-
egie Moscow Center led the study, “Russia in 
2020: Scenarios for the Future.” In contrast to 
Dynkin’s project and Medvedev’s expert group, 
the scenarios from the Carnegie Center are 
critical of Russia’s current system and oriented 
toward trans-Atlantic discourse.
1. Modernization as a domestic political 
task of the Putin system
Since the parliamentary elections in December 
2011, the modernization debate in Russia has 
also sharpened politically. First, irregularities 
in the parliamentary elections and general dis-
satisfaction with the government led to pub-
lic protests. In the summer of 2012, Russian 
citizens protested against limitations on the 
activities of civil society organizations. In Janu-
ary 2013, residents of Moscow demonstrated 
against the Russian government’s ban on the 
adoption of Russian children by US citizens. To 
date, popular resentment has not been molli-
fied by modern governmental measures. 
There are recurring rallies against the govern-
ment in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as 
in Russian regional centres. However, there 
have not to date been charismatic personali-
society, however, the situation is very different: 
In the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012, 
the country places 99th out of 128 states in its 
transformation management. Making Russia 
into a sustainably modern country remains a 
task for Russian society, as well as for Russia’s 
European partners.
Putin’s articles in the media before the election 
make clear that, in his view, modernization can 
only succeed with the help of an influential 
Russian state and a technological breakthrough. 
The debate about Russia’s future development 
has become a national task. Several groups 
of experts have given their substantive views. 
Supporters of Dmitri Medvedev, the previous 
president and current prime minister, have 
given further thought to the term moderniza-
tion. In their view, society carries out the coun-
try’s development. Only civic engagement and 
political participation bring about an effective 
middle class, federalism and the rule of law. 
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The Transformation Index (BTI) compares individual states in various categories
and thereby evaluates the deliberately politically guided transition
to democracy and a market economy. 3
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ties to spearhead the protests. Demonstrators 
criticize the government, call for free elections, 
and demand a fight against corruption. There 
is little in the way of plans; nevertheless, the 
protests remain a challenge to the legitimacy 
and the performance of the Putin system.
To date, the system has reacted with restric-
tive methods. Before the 2012 summer break 
the Russian parliament (Duma), which has a 
majority of Putin supporters, rapidly passed 
a series of laws that take aim at civil society 
activities. Russian non-governmental organiza-
tions that are financed with Western funds are 
now subject to special inspection measures in 
their substantive work and financial reporting. 
In addition, they are required by law to iden-
tify themselves as “agents of the West.” At the 
same time, Russian judicial authorities took 
strong measures against the feminist punk 
band Pussy Riot and against Alexei Navalny, 
one of the protests’ leaders. In contrast, the 
Russian administration took little action dur-
ing catastrophic flooding in July 2012, which 
claimed 170 lives in the north Caucasus city of 
Krimsk. In this case, the people themselves had 
to come to terms with the effects of the natural 
catastrophe. In domestic politics, the Putin sys-
tem is attempting to demonstrate an autocratic 
system of power and to use restrictive methods 
to counteract society’s democratic tendencies.
In terms of Russia’s economic growth, current 
prognoses show slow-downs and stagnation. 
Growth in Russian GDP for 2013 and 2014 is 
predicted to reach no higher than 3.7 percent. 
As long as the Russian economy grows at least 
at a minimal pace, social services are provided 
for broad strata of the population, and no per-
sonal alternative to Putin is in sight, a wave 
of protests that sweep the country is not to be 
expected.
What might happen in the case of an economic 
and financial crisis is difficult to predict in the 
present circumstances. At a special session of 
the Russian government on 31 January 2013, 
Putin made clear that his administration has 
the key role in the country’s social and eco-
nomic development over the next five years. 
2. Global goals
Over the last two years, Russia has pursued the 
two following foreign policy priorities: efforts to 
become a global economic player, and influence 
over its neighbouring countries. Russia’s global 
efforts are visible through its membership in 
the G20, the G8, its accession to the WTO, its 
efforts to join the OECD, and its status as a 
BRIC state. The common denominator among 
these forums is economic interest; common val-
ues, by contrast, play a subordinate role.
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as a member state, the Eurasian Union will 
remain a paper tiger, without the capabilities 
for democratic actions.
European strategies
To date, the EU has only adapted its policies 
to new developments in the Putin system to a 
limited extent. Russia is particularly interested 
in a partnership for modernization, and the 
tasks that stem from it, such as implementing 
WTO accession or introducing visa-free travel. 
In questions of visa-free travel, thanks to the 
engagement of Polish Foreign Minister Sikor-
ski and support from the German government, 
a special regulation was signed for the Kalin-
ingrad region and northern Poland. In March 
2013, the German government announced that 
it would allow visa-free travel for holders of 
Russian service passports. In the interest of its 
own elites, the Putin system will welcome this 
development. Its usefulness for the Russian 
population will, however, be limited.
The EU-Russia summit in December 2012 
reflected the current state, prospects and prob-
lems of bilateral relations. Currently the top of 
the agenda is occupied by the crisis of Europe-
an integration, which has placed the communi-
ty of European states under enormous pressure 
to act. For Russia, the euro crisis is an addition-
al argument for why the EU remains an inter-
esting partner to only a limited extent. Added 
to this is the Third European Energy Package, 
which is interpreted in Moscow as being set up 
against Russia. 
For itself and its neighbours, Russia sees the 
Eurasian Union as an alternative to the EU. To 
give this Union emphasis vis-à-vis the EU, the 
Russian government presents itself as speaker 
for and framer of the Eurasian Union, which 
leads to incomprehension in the EU. From 
Brussels’ point of view, the Eurasian Union 
remains an administrative paper tiger. Politi-
cally, the member states have criticized Rus-
sia’s dominance over its neighbours. The EU 
only recognizes Russia’s role in the Eurasian 
Union under the condition that Russia can only 
shape the Union according to the regulations 
of the WTO. 
Russia is also seeking an equal role as a global 
partner. In August 2012, following 18 years of 
negotiations, it was able to ratify membership 
in the WTO. As a result of the obligations in 
the trade regulations, Russia’s trading partners 
will see relaxation in trade conditions, although 
it remains to be seen how the Russian civil ser-
vice will put the treaty provisions into practice. 
Russia’s role as a global economic actor is neg-
atively characterized because of the prevalent 
corruption and the undemocratic political cli-
mate. The country is interested in using interna-
tional cooperation for its technocratic approach 
to modernization. This method, however, runs 
up against the limits of Western approaches to 
modernization, which place democratic values 
in the foreground. 
In its direct neighbourhood, Russia is dem-
onstrating increasing dominance. The most 
important instrument in this regard is the Eur-
asian Union, which is supposed to be concep-
tually similar to the European Union. Member 
states are the Russian Federation, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan; potential members include Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan. In contrast to the Euro-
pean Union’s model of integration, the dynamic 
of integration in this region does not come from 
the states jointly – it is determined by Russia.
The Kremlin is attempting to create integration 
with the tools of economic and political depend-
ence. Institutional and personal responsibilities 
are, to date, difficult to ascertain. Within this 
framework, at the beginning of 2010 a common 
customs union and a common economic space 
were created with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan under Russia’s dominance. 
One problematic aspect of these post-Soviet 
institutions is that they hinder cooperation 
with the EU. This conflict of interests was the 
reason that Ukraine has, to date, declined to 
join the Eurasian integration space. Russia 
reacted with high prices for natural gas. At pre-
sent, Ukraine pays $430 per thousand cubic 
meters of gas, while Belarus only pays $166. 
It remains to be seen what results will come 
from the direct negotiations between presi-
dents Putin and Yanukovych. Without a trans-
parent set of institutions and without Ukraine 5
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The partnership for modernization continues to 
have significant meaning for European-Russian 
relations, in which Russia is pursuing tech-
nocratic interests and the EU emphasizes the 
importance of civil society as an integral part of 
modernization. In addition, Russian diplomacy 
only has a limited amount of interest in negotia-
tions with the many-layered structure of Euro-
pean institutions. Instead, the Kremlin prefers 
to fashion its relations on a peer level with EU 
member states.
To date, the EU has not succeeded in nego-
tiating a new basic agreement with Russia. 
Although the PCA from 1997, which remains 
valid, has lost its attractiveness, neither of the 
two sides wishes to withdraw, in order not to 
send any negative signals for cooperation. 
Compared with current political realities, the 
agreement does not form the foundation for a 
comprehensive partnership based on common 
values and norms. Poland, the Baltic states, 
and increasingly other EU states as well, are 
criticizing how the Russian government and its 
dominance over its neighbouring states breach-
es democratic values; the German parliament’s 
resolution “Strengthen the Rule of Law and 
Civil Society in Russia Through Cooperation,” 
passed on 6 November 2012, is one example.
Bilateral criticism is driving relations between 
the EU and Russia into a dead end. Getting out 
of it will require a broader political discourse, 
the development of networks, and academic 
analysis of the situation in Russia, upon which 
new adjustments in the relations could be 
made. The results of this discourse could flow 
into a new agreement, one whose European 
reach would become apparent as the EU mem-
ber states examined it as part of the ratification 
process.
Modernization debate as a key 
moment
The understanding of and interest in moderni-
zation are key moments in Russian-European 
relations. Russia’s modernization and its attrac-
Russian Federation (RU)
Kazakhstan (KZ)
Kyrgyzstan (KG)
Tajikistan (TJ)
Belarus (BY)
Ukraine (UA)
Moldova (MD)
Moscow
GDP 2012, € billions
* According to the ofﬁcial exchange rate 11 March 2013, USD in EUR
12,894.3
RU KZ TJ KG Total
1,498.1***** * 153.8 5.6 4.8 1,706.9
Population 2012, in millions 503.7 142.5 17.5 7.8 5.5 182.9
EU
Potential Members
Euroasian Union
BY
44.6
9.6
Members
Eurasian Union
Eurasian Union, potential members
European Union
Source: Eurostat, CIA World Factbook © Bertelsmann Stiftung
EU and Eurasian Union in comparison6
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seeking state into one with a modern economy 
and a strong middle class. To do that, the Putin 
system must enlarge the space for societal par-
ticipation and strengthen its economic success 
sustainably to enable the country to undertake 
sustainable modernization. This process is not 
a matter of a change of regime that is supported 
from the outside, but rather of breaking down 
the lags in modernization.
The Russian government views the EU as hav-
ing limited usefulness as a partner in mod-
ernization, because the EU has its hands full 
with the euro crisis, and because the decision-
making processes among 27 member states 
are at a standstill. In the search for partners in 
modernization, Russia is turning instead to the 
institutions of globalization. Since August 2012, 
Russia has been a member in the WTO; the gov-
ernment is signalling its interest in full mem-
bership in the OECD; and Russia has already 
acceded to the OECD anti-corruption conven-
tion. Full membership would oblige Russia to 
live up to important basic principles of a mod-
ern state with responsibility to its population: 
free trade; an independent judiciary; science 
and technology; an effective system of educa-
tion; social policy; competitive governmental 
leadership; as well as obligations in govern-
mental development aid according to standards 
set by the United Nations.
The OECD standards can be used as guidelines 
for Russia’s modernization. The Russian gov-
ernment uses membership in the G8 and G20 
to help shape the global agenda. Holding the 
presidency of the various groupings is particu-
larly useful in this regard. In 2013, Russia holds 
the presidency of the G20; of the G8 in 2014. 
In 2015, Germany will take over presidency of 
the G8 from Russia. From this succession and 
from the various groupings arise opportunities 
to shape the global agenda for both Brussels 
and the Kremlin.
On the other hand, Russia is challenged to 
prove the viability of its approach to moderni-
zation. The limits of the technocratic approach 
can be seen in the public protests as well as in 
the extractive nature of the economy. The EU is 
well advised to make use of Russia’s interests in 
the global institutions; they open opportunities 
tiveness as a partner for the EU are based on 
Russian oil and Russian gas. The Putin system 
has reacted to developments in the European 
energy market by making institutional changes. 
For example, BP’s joint venture in Russia, BP-
TNK, has agreed to sell 50 percent of its shares 
to the state-owned oil company Rosneft, in an 
equity swap. Rosneft’s daily production of 10.37 
million barrels puts it ahead of Arab countries 
and makes it the world’s largest oil producer. 
Rosneft is administratively weak, but is never-
theless considered a major pillar of the Putin 
system.
The ability of the Russian state to take action 
depends on prices in global energy markets. 
Russia is an important partner in delivering oil 
and gas to Europe. In addition, opportunities for 
import and export are not exhausted. To make 
Russia attractive for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, to use renewable energy and the 
human capital of the Russian population, will 
require a comprehensive approach to moderni-
zation. In this regard, Russia’s interests and 
those of the West overlap. Russian society must 
take an active role in these processes in order 
to profit from them.
The modernization of Russia and the country’s 
conspicuous shortcomings on the path to being 
a global shaper of politics and economics remain 
challenges on Russia’s political agenda, as well 
as for its European partners. This results from 
the country’s geopolitical and economic impor-
tance. A key moment on the way to these goals 
would be pluralistic discourse about moderni-
zation within the country, combined with West-
ern expertise. In addition, there is a need for 
international experience, which is available in 
international organizations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF. However, Russia is much 
too independent and energy-rich to let itself be 
influenced by demands from the outside. 
Western actors would be well advised to devel-
op approaches together with Russian partners. 
The key to success is in the discourse and in the 
cooperation between Europe and Russia. Strate-
gically, the course of action cannot always pro-
ceed in a peer-to-peer fashion, but it is a matter 
of joining diverging interests into a common 
roadmap. Russia must develop from a rent-7
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for new forms of dialogue. From that can arise 
points of contact to reshape the understanding 
of modernization, and to reduce the current 
gap between the common interests and diverg-
ing values of Russia and the EU. The shortfall 
in common value is increasingly turning into a 
lack of knowledge about each other – including 
actors, processes and policy areas.
One important task for Europe is the establish-
ment of think tanks in policy-oriented analysis 
of Russia. These centres, with participation 
from Russia and the other post-Soviet states, 
would work on a realignment of relations: From 
a new institutional approach, from analyses, 
and from newly constructed networks a road 
map to a new basic agreement between Russia 
and Europe that is attractive and gives direc-
tions to both sides can be developed.
Successful realignment of the EU’s relations 
with Russia is a contemporary question of 
Europe’s ability to act. As a global actor, the 
European Union must speak with one voice if 
it is to be capable of taking action in questions 
of energy and security that involve Russia. The 
EU will only be an attractive partner for a mod-
ern Russia if the Union is capable of overcom-
ing its finance crisis. To reach that goal, the 
EU must develop and implement new forms of 
institutional cooperation, such as tiered inte-
gration through partial membership in a free-
trade zone.
Viewed historically, the dynamic between deep-
ening and broadening the European Union has 
been a successful recipe for prosperity and 
security on the European continent. The trail-
blazers for developing innovative European-
Russia relations should be the EU member 
states that are tied to Russia through common 
interests and values: Germany, Finland and 
Poland. s
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